Abstract-SSH (Secure Shell) uses public keys for authenticating servers and users. This paper summarizes progress in SSH key management so far, highlights outstanding problems, and presents requirements for a long-term solution. Proposals are solicited from the research community to address the issue. The problem is of high practical importance, as most of our critical Internet infrastructure, cloud services, and open source software development is protected using these keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
SSH (Secure Shell) [13] is an encryption protocol that is used for managing most Unix/Linux servers, Internet routers, and much of cloud computing infrastructure. It is also widely used for committing code to version control repositories and inside various systems management tools.
The SSH protocol provides host authentication using public keys associated with hosts, called host keys. These keys are used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, such as stealing passwords or command injection after authentication.
The protocol also uses public keys for user authentication. These keys are called user keys. Public key authentication is used, for example, for accessing Linux instances in Amazon AWS, committing source code into github, for automating systems management, and for single sign-on.
In working with dozens of large financial institutions, we have made several alarming discoveries regarding SSH user keys. First is their sheer number: many of the companies whose environments have been scanned had several million keys authorized to log in across tens of thousands, sometimes over a hundred thousand servers. In some cases a single key can access thousands of servers.
Second, extensive monitoring of the usage of the keys has revealed that in several of the large financial institutions that our team has worked with, about 90% of the authorized keys have been unused. That is, they are access credentials that were provisioned years ago, the need for which ceased to exist or the person having the private key left, and the authorized key was never deprovisioned. This signifies a failure of identify and access management (IAM) practices. We have also found that in several of the organizations we have worked with, about 10% of the authorized keys grant root or administrator access.
Third, it is rare for organizations to have the capability to quickly replace SSH user keys even when they know there has been a breach and that private keys may have been compromised. In fact, of the dozens of large enterprises we have knowledge of, we estimate that only one or two might have been able to replace their SSH keys in reasonable time.
II. HOST KEYS
The SSH client uses the server's host key for authenticating the server. In OpenSSH, for example, host keys of known servers are stored in a known hosts file. When the user first connects to a server, he/she is shown the fingerprint of the server's host key and asked whether to accept it. On later connections, OpenSSH verifies that the key has not changed, and asks the user to accept the new key if it has changed.
A. Problems with TOFU
SSH's original and still dominant approach to host key management is called TOFU (Trust on First Use) [15] . While this approach was great for grass-roots deployment, it has become a problem.
TOFU works well for small static environments with techsavvy users, but offers little security in large dynamic environments. This has effectively led to a breakdown of SSH's man-in-the-middle attack protection and opened it up for various active network-level attacks, including password stealing, data theft, and command injection. Numerous free tools are available for performing these attacks.
According to research by Gutmann [4] , users do not check host key fingerprints in practice. Our anecdotal experience supports this. Users do not understand the warnings about changed host keys and even for experts, verifying the keys is too cumbersome to do reliably. Furthermore, in a large enterprise hundreds of new hosts are installed or reinstalled every day, leading to significant key churn.
The uniqueness, security, and validation of host keys is critical for man-in-the-middle attack prevention. We thus find ourselves in a situation where the host authentication in SSH is not reliably serving its function of preventing man-in-themiddle attacks. Thus the mechanism needs to be augmented or replaced by a mechanism that provides better security and smoother operations in large environments.
B. Attempts to improve host key management
The SSH protocol was originally designed to work without any centralized key infrastructure, as none existed for ordinary servers in 1995, and even today one really only exists for HTTPS servers. Also, the size of large IT environments has grown since then by orders of magnitude.
Peng and Zhao [10] describes a method for initializing trust for network devices using SSH, where a central system manages and generates a list of known hosts and distributes it to the managed devices. However, in their system a human is assumed to verify the fingerprint of the central device.
Another attempted approach has been to store SSH host keys in DNS (Domain Name System) using SSHFP records [11] . Even though this is an IETF standards-track specification that has been around for over a decade, it has not seen extensive use.
Jones [6] presents a layered approach that uses DNSSEC to store the location and public key of a key distribution server, but keys for individual entities are stored in the key distribution server(s).
Redhat Linux supports using the ProxyCommand feature in the OpenSSH client to fetch the host key for the host being connected to from a central registry into a known hosts file, and reading it from that file.
Wendlandt et al [15] proposed to use notary servers to track the history of host keys used by servers and return signed statements indicating which keys have been used by the server and when.
Alicherry and Keromytis [2] discusses shortcomings of TOFU and possible attacks. They propose fetching the host key using a second means, such as using tor to fetch the host key using a different network path.
Ali and Smith [1] have proposed using a keyed MAC for host authentication.
Napier [9] suggests NFS (Network File System) mounting a centrally maintained known hosts file.
Tectia SSH has long supported X.509 certificates for host authentication. This approach has been successfully deployed in various financial institutions. OpenSSH supports its own proprietary certificate format for host keys.
Based on working with dozens of of large enterprises, the vast majority of organizations today do not seem to have a system in place for managing SSH host keys. This significantly weakens the man-in-the-middle attack protections offered by SSH in practice.
C. Promising Approaches
There does not seem to be a way to fully solve SSH host key management without adding new code in several widely used SSH implementations. OpenSSH certificates, use of X.509 certificates, something similar to how Let's encrypt handles X.509 certificates for SSL, and the ProxyCommand approach in RedHat are all potentially promising avenues. Alternatively, using DNS to locate a key distribution server might be relatively easy to make work in practice.
In any case, one approach needs to be selected, standardized, server side implemented, and support added to several common clients. Interoperability between the new system and existing implementations is going to be critically important during the transition period.
III. USER AUTHENTICATION KEYS
User keys are a mechanism for authenticating a user to an SSH server. Kent and Shrestha [7] is one of the earliest comprehensive descriptions of the problems caused by SSH user key profileration. It is still relevant and a good description of how SSH keys work.
A. Current best practice for user keys
The best current practice for managing SSH user keys is described in in NIST IR 7966 [14] . It involves discovering existing keys by scanning installed systems, monitoring which keys are actually used, removing unused and policy-violating keys, assigning ownership to remaining keys, and implementing a proper provisioning and termination process for keybased access.
B. Other attempts to address user keys
Tectia SSH supports X.509v3 certificates for user keys. These are widely used with smartcards, including the PIV and CAC cards used by the US government.
OpenSSH supports its own proprietary certificate format also for user keys and grants access to users using certificates. However, we are not aware of of any hardened CA (Certificate Authority) solutions for these proprietary certificates, and thus managing their life cycle in any security-conscious organization is a problem. The use of OpenSSH certificates for user keys makes it difficult or impossible to audit by examining a server which keys have access to the server. Instead, one has to rely on auditing the CA, and when the CA is not hardened and designed for audit, a trustworthy audit of issued certificates is not possible. Revoking OpenSSH certificates is also very cumbersome and must be done separately on every server.
OpenSSH offers the AuthorizedKeysCommand option, which can be used to specify a program to fetch authorized keys for a user from a directory or from another source. This is a very powerful feature that can be used to build centralized access provisioning solutions.
The STAR key management system [3] is perhaps the earliest published general-purpose SSH user key management system.
RedHat Linux IPA (Identity, Policy, Audit) supports storing SSH user keys in an LDAP directory. It uses the OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand option to run a helper program that fetches authorized keys from the directory.
Netflix BLESS [8] is an approach to controlling SSH access using ephemeral certificates that are issued on-demand based on information in an external directory. This appoach shows promise for new environments and is employed in, e.g., PrivX (from SSH.COM).
Napier [9] implements least privilege using SSH keys, sudo, and setuid, and gives recommendations for using SSH keys and command restrictions. Thorpe [12] describes a system that implements a secure su for executing privileged operations using SSH keys.
It seems that centralizing information about user-to-user access grants is desirable, for both automated and interactive access. The ultimate solution might be a new authentication method in SSH, or it might be built on top of existing public key authentication using user keys, with the AuthorizedKeysCommand used for fetching authorizations on the server side, and some new mechanism (e.g., a new authentication agent, possibly with extensions to the agent protocol) used for fetching the proper keys on the client side. This could be combined with caching information on the server side to reduce delays, allow operation even when the centralized server is temporarily down, and minimize man-in-the-middle attack possibilities.
The BLESS approach also looks very promising for interactive access. It can be easily integrated with Active Directory or LDAP and be used to provision access on demand. It works particularly well for interactive access by users in environments where access can be forced to go through a jump server. Alternatively, an agent integrated to the SSH client or SSH agent on the client side could be used to obtain a certificate for each connection.
In our opinion, a good solution would likely include: 1) centralizing information about user-to-user access grants, for both interactive and automated access; 2) using short-lived certificates or a new authentication method for on-demand access by interactive users; and 3) implementing a client-side agent or extension to fetch credentials from a server when a new connection is established.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING APPROACHES
While there are several open source packages for generating and distributing OpenSSH keys, the proprietary OpenSSH certificates are not supported by most clients and are are not standardized. Use of X.509v3 certificates with SSH is an IETF standard [5] , but it is not currently supported by OpenSSH. Use of OpenSSH certificates for user authentication further suffers from the difficulty of auditing from a server who has access to it, the lack of hardened certificate authorities, and the lack of multi-platform tools and standards for distributing them to servers and clients.
We are not aware of any automated mechanism for deploying a host into an SSH key management system during installation nor do we know of any existing mechanism for determining for host authentication whether to use TOFU or to acquire the host key from a key management system. The BLESS approach is not yet able to replace SSH keys for automated machine-to-machine access, nor can they transparently replace public key authentication in existing scripts and applications. Combining it with the NIST process helps, but that still do not fully address all of the use cases.
Many proposed solutions rely on specific, non-standardized features of a single implementation -OpenSSH. Enterprises use SSH on all sorts of platforms -Linux, Unix, Windows, Mac, z/OS, AS/400, routers, printers, modems, server management ports, storage boxes, IoT devices, libraries in applications, and more. There are dozens of implementations in wide use. Getting a solution universally deployed will require automation and eventual standardization.
V. SSH IN LARGE ENTERPRISES
Large enterprise IT environments are substantially different from what most independent software developers and researchers have experience with.
Enterprise information systems are heavily affected by regulations, especially for core production systems, financial systems, and personally identifiable information. Key elements of most regulations include controlling who has access to what systems and data, only granting access on a need basis, terminating access when it is no longer needed, the principle of least privilege, changing access credentials and security keys on a regular basis, and regular audit and improvement.
Large enterprises have thousands of servers. Informationintensive enterprises often have tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of servers.
Most users in large enterprises are restricted to using a limited set of applications, and their credentials only grant them access to those applications. Operating system level access is generally reserved to IT specialists -such as operations teams, system administrators, database administrators, and software engineers. However, some organizations have thousands of such IT specialists, many of them contractors.
Large enterprises usually employ some identity and access management system (IAM) for provisioning and terminating access for their users. Active Directory is widely used. However, these systems almost never cover machine-to-machine access using SSH keys. Service accounts running databases and application processes are often managed locally or using various legacy directories, including LDAP and NIS (Network Information Service), and are usually not part of their normal identity and access management.
SSH keys tend to accumulate not only from scripts and management tools, but also from system administrators and database administrators implementing their private single signon from their personal desktop or laptop to various systems and database accounts that they administer -often circumventing cumbersome privileged access management systems.
Based on our evaluation, enterprise IT systems are currently quite vulnerable to an attack spreading to other systems using SSH keys once a server or system administrator laptop/desktop has been compromised. It is already common for attackers and malware to collect SSH keys. Unterminated SSH access also makes organizations vulnerable to penetration using keys held by employees and consultants who have left the organization. The keys could leak even after the person has left.
Routers and server hardware (including IPMI ports, which also support SSH key based login) are often managed by different teams than logical servers. However, they are a major and business-critical use case for SSH. Server management ports are a particularly insidious way to gain and hide covert access to servers.
VI. REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE HOST KEY

MANAGEMENT
Protection from man-in-the-middle attacks is important. It is particularly important for preventing spread of attacks within an organization via password theft or command injection and for preventing compromise of connections over the Internet by state actors.
Making host authentication secure and practical implies the following requirements.
• Host key checking should be automatic and enforced by default.
-Rationale: Given that users do not check fingerprints [4] but the host key check is critical for man-in-themiddle attack protection, it must be somehow automated and automatically enforced. Users should not be relied on to accept keys.
• Initial deployment of a host into the system should be easy.
-Rationale: Ease of deployment is necessary for wide adoption for a tool that is installed on almost every system. Ideally, enrollment into the system should be automatic after simple organization-level configuration.
• Server upgrades and host key rotation should be automatically supported (once deployed).
-Rationale: Rotation support regularly changing keys. It is particularly important if there has been a compromise and may be required for compliance.
• The approach must work also for clients connecting from behind NAT (Network Address Translation) and inside organizations where computers generally do not have direct Internet access.
-Rationale: Most organizations implement NAT at their firewall/external connection. Some translate between IPv4 and IPv6. Some organizations perform NAT internally. Many cloud servers are behind NAT. Internal internet access is often restricted.
A. Requirements for future user key management 1) User key use cases: SSH keys are used to solve various access needs:
• Access by scripts, such as backup scripts, audit scripts, scripts for integrating applications, and log data collection tools • Agentless management by various enterprise applications, such as systems management and file transfers • Access to cloud instances • Access to version control repositories, such as git and github • Authorizing external file transfers • Access from jump servers to end hosts, and • Grass-roots single sign-on by system administrators, researchers, students, etc. -often crossing organizational boundaries.
2) User key management requirements:
Each use case should be considered in view of requirements for SSH access management, including the following:
• Ensure that access is terminated when a user leaves the organization or when automated access between systems is no longer needed.
-Rationale: Currently about 90% of all authorized keys are no longer used in the large organizations view have scanned, and represent unterminated access. This is a major security vulnerability, failure of access management process, and a violation of most security regulations.
• Implement and enforce proper approvals and accountability for machine-to-machine authentication, especially for access to privileged accounts.
-Rationale: Currently system administrators in many organizations install authorized keys at will, whenever needed for the task at hand, and no reliable record of keys exists. This leads to a lack of approvals and termination, non-enforcement of policy, and impossibility of auditing proper termination of machine-to-machine keys.
• Access to servers should be fully and easily auditable.
-Rationale: Security starts from knowing and controlling who has access to a system or data and at which level. It is important to be able to ensure that there are no backdoors and that processes are functioning throughout the access life cycle. -Audit should include enforcing proper approvals, proper termination, assignment of ownership to access grants, and enforcement of internal security boundaries.
• It should be possible to delegate who can grant access to which accounts.
-Rationale: In large enterprises, usually only application teams know who should transfer data with each application. Central security teams do not know each application intimately. Large enterprises run thousands of applications. In universities and smaller organizations, flexibility and ease of use are key.
• Rotating user credentials should be supported.
-Rationale: If user keys have been compromised, changing them is imperative. Most large enterprises today do not seem to have that capability. Periodically changing keys reduces risk of leaks and exploitation.
• Use of access credentials should be monitored and it should be possible to centrally identify and revoke access rights that are not used or that violate policy.
-Rationale: Application teams and individuals often fail to properly terminate access when it is no longer needed. This requirement establishes a second line of defense, beyond the normal life cycle process, to ensure that unused access eventually gets terminated.
B. General requirements
The following requirements apply to an SSH key management system in general, for both host keys and user keys.
• Mixing clients and servers that support the new mechanism and clients and servers that do not support it should be supported. While the new system is gradually being deployed, new clients used with new servers should provide full security benefits while allowing interoperability with legacy clients and servers. The determination of whether a host supports the new system should be as reliable as possible.
-Rationale: There is no way to upgrade large enterprises in a single go. The transition is likely to last many years, possibly over a decade. -Interoperability is absolutely critical. There are dozens of SSH client and server implementations in wide use on different platforms. It will be a long time before they are all upgraded.
• The approach should work across organizational boundaries for collaboration, file transfers, cloud services, external version control repositories, and remote working.
-Rationale: Many organizations will have a hybrid onpremise and cloud setup for the next decade or more. -Countless software developers use cloud-based version control systems.
• The system should not create a single point of failure. It should be possible to continue to connect securely, at least for a time and to servers recently used by the connecting client, even if key management servers or parts of the network are down.
-Rationale: Systems sometimes go down but the enterprise should not. This might be achieved, e.g., via replication or caching.
• The system should not introduce denial-of-service opportunities.
-Rationale: If the SSH server communicates with external servers before authentication is complete, that introduces additional delay to the login process and may make it easy to implement resource exhaustion attacks agains the server.
• The system should not add excessive latency (several seconds is acceptable for a first connection, but regular connections should be reasonably fast).
-Rationale: We do not want to degrade user experience, introduce opportunities for denial-of-service, or unduely load servers. -We have seen servers in enterprises that get many keybased logins per second.
VII. CONCLUSION Given the prevalence of the SSH protocol in the Internet and cloud computing infrastructure and the alarming state of managing SSH keys in many enterprises, it is obvious that implementing processes and solutions is a priority.
SSH host key management and user key management are complicated and solutions must balance different requirements. It does not look like the ideal solution has been invented yet. Help is thus needed from the research community to address these issues and to introduce solutions to secure the Internet infrastructure and, indeed, the underlying infrastructure on which economies and our everyday life and work increasingly depend on.
